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Bermudez'  main  theme is  that  first-person  thoughts  require  a  less  elaborate
conceptual background than many philosophers think. In particular, a small child
can have the resources to think about herself independently of her developing
capacity to use a public language. In this way Bermudez aims to resolve the
paradox of the title: the circular trap formed by the apparent sophistication of I-
thoughts, requiring a rich repertoire of concepts (person, self, indexicality) and
the  apparent  impossibility  of  finding  a  route  to  the  acquisition  of  this
sophistication that does not presuppose the prior capacity to have such thoughts.
It is a very good book, suggestive and persuasive. I really think that anyone
interested  in  consciousness,  concepts,  the  self,  or  the  acquisition  of  folk
psychology, should read it. And of course I have some disagreements.
Bermudez  argues  that  there  can  be  non-conceptual  first-person  contents  to
thoughts. In a pre-conceptual stage of development a child can form thoughts
which refer to herself,  and these thoughts can then be the ground on which
concepts  of  self,  other  person,  and  objective  physical  world  can  grow.  He
describes several ways in which capacities that are plausibly innate in human
beings could provide the means for thinking about oneself. One of these ways is
perceptual, and relies on Gibson's ecological optics. The main idea is that when
one sees one is situated with respect to a visual field that has a certain topology.
One moves towards some things, some things are nearer than others; in general
one finds that the information that one is picking up has a center, one's invisible
location,  and changes in  a  way that  defines  a  trajectory,  ones  path through
space. So in processing visual data in a way that respects this topology one is
2implicitly representing a self-as-location. 
The other  main argument  for  the accessibility  of  I-thoughts  concerns  action.
Bermudez draws on a variety of data to argue that in the control of bodily motion
we make use of a system of representations in which the body and its parts play
a  privileged  role.  But  this  is  not  the  same structure  as  in  vision.  Bermudez
presents a daring and interesting analysis which I think can be summarized by
saying that  the progress of  bodily  motions is  represented in terms of a tree
structure in which the torso is the base and other bodily locations are identified
in terms of a series of branching points leading from the torso. (If this is right
then it would be conceptually easier to learn to flap ones fingernails than to split
ones  chest  in  two.)  The  important  point  is  that  this  structure  too  defines  a
privileged location with respect to which other loci are identified. (So both the
visual and the motor data structures implicitly locate a self, though the first self
lives between the eyes and the second nearer the heart.)
What these two arguments have in common is a simple insight. Suppose one
thinks of  a seen object  or a body part  in terms of its relation to one's  own
position, e.g. as a little off to the left. This thought can be taken as about the
object and predicating P of it, where P holds of objects bearing R to oneself. But
it can also be taken as about oneself and predicating Q of one, where Q holds of
objects  to  which  some  other  thing  bears  R.  (For  one  thing,  both  types  of
covariance can hold: if the thing had been differently located the thought would
have been different  in  one way,  but  if  one had been differently  located the
thought would have been different in another way.) Thus we see the specific
sense in which one sees oneself whenever one sees almost anything, in that one
sees  that  a  relation  hold  between  the  thing  and  oneself.  So  thoughts  that
represent the self  can be had without introspection, higher-order thought,  or
even a developed concept of a person.
3Thinking about oneself in these rudimentary ways is obviously a long way short
of full rich intellectual self-consciousness. Bermudez argues that starting with a
creature  with  the  kind  of  I-thoughts  just  described  we  can  equip  it  with
something like a Nagelian point  of  view if  we add a temporal  aspect.  If  the
creature can also recognize the locations and objects as being ones that bore
self-related properties at specific past times then it has an implicit grasp of its
own history with respect to the objects and locations. And this gives it a capacity
for some patterns of thinking characteristic of richer kinds of self-consciousness.
Bermudez comes to the Kantian-Strawsonian conclusion that a conscious point of
view, which appreciates the contrasts between self and other and experience and
object, must be spatially based. I suspect that the argument here really leads to
a weaker conclusion, that such a point of view must be based on thoughts about
a set of relations whose Ramsey-sentence is much like that of naive geometry.
There may also be other instantiations. 
I have not yet mentioned an aspect that is central to Bermudez' exposition, that
of non-conceptual content. For him what the arguments I have been simplifying
show  is  that  one  can  have  thoughts  which  involve  a  non-conceptual
representation of oneself. They are non-conceptual in that they do not require
the kind of language-dependent, holism-respecting, generality-constraint-obeying
cognition that is characteristic of the reflective thought of adult humans. One of
my  purposes  in  outlining  Bermudez'  argument  without  mentioning  non-
conceptual content is to show that it can be done. Bermudez' accomplishment
can be described, I think, in more straightforward terms as showing that there
are simple forms of I-thinking which can be a basis for more sophisticated forms.
I think, in fact, that Bermudez has innocently gone along with some fashionable
ways of talking when in fact his arguments not only do not require them, but
tend to undermine them.
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demanding interpretation of conceptual thinking, and yet think that there is a lot
of real thinking which does not meet the demands. Advocates of non-conceptual
thought associate with each concept a set of criteria which have to be met by
someone who has 'mastered' the concept. Failure to meet criteria of the kind
typical  of  full  mastery  of  adult  concepts  means  that  what  is  shaping  ones
thinking is  not a concept.  But it  is  still  thinking, still  about things,  still  often
leading  to  true  or  false  conclusions.  So  it  is  thinking  that  is  done  with  un-
concepts, leading to thoughts which are not beliefs. Un-concepts have all the
important characteristics of a concept except that of meeting some philosophical
constraints on concept mastery.
But this is highly resistible. And two reasons why it should be resisted are
both reinforced by Bermudez' considerations. One reason is the fact that many
concepts are never fully mastered by any adult.  Bermudez writes that spatial
awareness - a necessary but not sufficient condition for having thoughts about
oneself as located, and thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for having
the concept of self - requires that one have "an understanding of the nature of
space" (p 198, and on p 171 conceptual thought is burdened with needing a full
understanding of  the anture of  objects.)  If  "an understanding" means "some
grasp  or  other,  however  weak"  then  the  condition  is  vacuous.  If  it  means
"understanding the real nature of space" it is not satisfied by mere humans. Even
if it means "having predominantly true beliefs (thoughts) about space" it may be
false of most of us. The point is that space is a deep property of the universe
which  is  grasped  to  different  degrees  by  ants,  babies,  and  physicists,  and
perfectly  by  none of  them.  If  an  angel  possessing  the  true  nature  of  space
descended and began to enlighten us, we would probably at first suspect that it
violated some apriori condition on having a space-concept.
The second, closely related, reason for resisting non-conceptual contents
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have to describe an ideal of conceptual thinking to which mature thought could
approximate. But the conditions would almost never be fully met. This is clear
with holistic constraints, according to which the tenability of a person's set of
beliefs depends on their overall structure, so that a change in any belief should
set of a check for possible tensions throughout the set. Not only are these clearly
not satisfied by most people at most times, it is far from clear that any human
person could ever fully satisfy them. So to that extent all of us are all of the time
operating at something below the fully conceptual level. In Bermudez' exposition
the issue arises with his need for explanatory minimalism, positing a certain level
of conceptual development only when a less demanding explanation cannot be
used. Even non-conceptual contents are not to be attributed when a mechanistic
explanation would apply. Thus he requires that a creature's behavior is not to be
explained in terms of representations of spatial features of its environment if it is
sensitive merely to features that covary with spatial features (p 211). But this
seems much too demanding. A person navigating around a city is sensitive to
street signs and landmarks, and these are not themselves pure coordinates but
features linked to coordinates by profound and superficial  principles.  A driver
using a map is sensitive to spatial features of the map, which covary with spatial
features of the town. The problem here is very general. Every level of thought
not  only  includes  but  probably  depends  essentially  on  processes  that  are
characteristic of more primitive thinking. So forms of explanation appropriate to
simple thinking have their place among the tools for explaining complex thinking.
(Einstein had his conditioned reflexes, some relevant to the way he understood
the continuum.) Any criterion for relegating some contentful thought to the non-
conceptual reserve will if consistently applied also relegate much normal adult
thinking. 
At the end of the book Bermudez tries to make explicit  how the sub-
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capacity to use the first person pronoun. The crucial link is between spatially
mediated  mechanisms  of  joint  attention  and  the  satisfaction  of  Gricean
conditions on communication. This is an important topic, and what Bermudez
says  raises  the  possibility  that  without  innate  capacities  to  share  our  spatial
awareness human beings would loose a basic route to linguistic communication.
I cannot make out in this chapter a definite deduction of a set of conditions for
the  possession  of  the  mature  I-concept  from  a  capacity  to  have  a  spatio-
temporal point of view and to share allusions to it with others. What I can make
out are a number of very suggestive devices by which spatial sophistication can
facilitate  thinking  about  oneself  and  others.  Given  my  skepticism  about
conditions for concept possession I should not expect more.
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